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Introduction 
 
The aim of this paper is to explore the intricate issue of the 
right to die with dignity by focusing on the role of the 
patient’s family. The paper considers a number of real-life 
cases. These are, by no means, exhaustive cases, but they 
are illustrative, exemplifying common problems that occur 
in medical settings in the Western world. The cases 
demonstrate the importance of caution in incidents when 
the best interests of the patient’s family members 
contradict the best interests of the patient. The two cases 
from Britain and The Netherlands will bring us to consider 
the role of advance directives at the end of life. 
The question of how we can (or should) protect a 
person’s autonomy is of major importance. People who 
believe that rational patients should have the right to 
arrange their own deaths, with the help of willing 
physicians, often appeal to autonomy as justification. But 
those who object to this idea claim that people who really 
want to stay alive might be killed, maintaining that leaving 
the decision in the hands of the patient’s family might 
negate the patient’s autonomy. Here, we have to 
distinguish between an implicit and an explicit desire to die 
and between formal and speculative autonomy. By formal 
autonomy it is referred to when the patient actually made a 
decision. Speculative autonomy is what the patient would 
have decided if he or she had the ability to make a 
decision. In assessing speculative autonomy, much 
attention is given to the opinion of those representing the 
patient's best interests. 
In re Fiori,1 the mother of a Post-Coma Unawareness 
(PCU)2 patient who lost consciousness in 1976, filed a 
petition requesting an order directing the nursing home to 
terminate treatment. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
held that a close relative acting as substitute decision-
maker, with the consent of two physicians, could remove 
life-sustaining treatment from the adult PCU patient where 
the patient left no advance directives. It could be assumed 
that, after so many years in this condition, the chances for a 
degree of recovery on the part of the patient were 
extremely slim. The Court emphasized that close family 
members are usually the most knowledgeable about the 
patient’s preferences, goals and values and that they have 
“an understanding about the nuances of our personality 
                                                          
1 In re Daniel Fiori, 543 Pa. 592, 673 A.2d 905 (2 April 1996). 
2 I explain why I prefer the tem PCU to PVS in my book The 
Right to Die with Dignity: An Argument in Ethics, Medicine, and 
Law (Piscataway, NJ.: Rutgers University Press, 2001). I perceive 
the term PVS to be ethically problematic, arguing that the term 
“vegetative” undermines the patient’s best interests. 
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that set us apart as individuals.”3  
The conclusions of the American President’s 
Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems and 
Biomedical and Behavioral Research are relevant to the 
discussion. The President’s Commission argued that “the 
family is generally most concerned about the good of the 
patient” and that the family “deserves recognition as an 
important social unit that ought to be treated, within limits, 
as a responsible decision-maker in matters that intimately 
affect its members” [1]. 
Thus, family members, or other guardians, are 
permitted to make decisions on behalf of a patient on the 
basis of their acquaintance with the patient, believing that 
they know what the patient would have chosen were he/she 
competent to make decisions. The substituted judgement 
test is intended to determine with as much accuracy as 
possible the wants and needs of the individual involved. 
The reasoning is similar to that of John Rawls. Rawls 
suggests in A Theory of Justice that “We must choose for 
others as we have reason to believe they would choose for 
themselves if they were at the age of reason and deciding 
rationally” [2]. Rawls maintains that trustees, guardians 
and benefactors usually know the situation and interests of 
their wards and, thus, they can often make accurate 
estimates as to what would have been wanted [2]. 
Accordingly, when applying the substituted judgement 
test to determine whether an incompetent adult would 
refuse life-saving or life-prolonging treatment if he or she 
were competent, the decision of the patient’s family and 
his/her friends, particularly where that decision is in accord 
with the recommendation of the attending physician, is of 
particular importance. American law recognizes as valid a 
consent to treatment of an incompetent patient given in a 
traditional manner by the family, next of kin, or a guardian 
for treatment of an incompetent person.4 Note that the 
substituted judgement test assumes that people are able to 
reliably conclude what are the wishes of Aunt Jane, wishes 
that the average reasonable person might not have uttered 
because that person is not in the position of Aunt Jane. 
                                                          
3 See also In re Daniel Fiori, 438 Pa.Super. 610, 652 A.2d 1350 
(17 January 1995). See also In re Guardianship of Crum, No. 
404369, 61 Ohio Misc.2d 596, 580 N.E.2d 876 (19 September 
1991). Conversely, in W v M and others [2011] EWHC 2443 
(Fam) in Great Britain, application to the Court of Protection to 
authorise the withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration from 
a patient in a minimally conscious state on the basis of that 
patient’s previously expressed wishes and feelings was refused. 
Mr Justice Baker held that a best interests’ decision had to be 
made, that the patient’s life was not overly burdensome, that 
while she did experience pain and discomfort, and her disability 
severely restricted what she could do, the patient did have some 
positive experiences and there was a reasonable prospect that 
those experiences can be extended by a planned programme of 
increased stimulation. The preservation of life was a fundamental 
principle and the views of the patient’s family about her likely 
wishes were not to be given significant weight. 
4 See In re Guardianship of McInnis, No. 145869, 61 Ohio 
Misc.2d 790, 584 N.E.2d 1389 (1 November 1991); John F. 
Kennedy Memorial Hospital Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So 2d 921, 
(Fla 1984), p. 926; In re Jobes, 108 NJ 394, 529 A 2d 434, (NJ 
1987), pp. 444-447; In re L.H.R., 321 SE 2d 716, (Ga 1984), p. 
723.  
If treatment can be terminated when a PCU patient left 
no advance directive, upon reliance on the statements of 
the patient's family, obviously it could be terminated when 
the patient had left such directives.  
The patient’s best interests are at the centre of the 
analysis of the current paper. This term is beneficence-
based. It calls for a clinical judgment about treatment 
options that would produce a clinically acceptable outcome 
for the patient. Such a basis excludes decisions that are 
maleficent. The paper’s methodology is based on extensive 
fieldwork in dozens of hospitals and research centres, on 
broad literature review, and on in-depth analysis of legal 
precedents. The paper critically analyses selected court 
cases from the United States, Great Britain and The 
Netherlands. It assesses the role of advance directives and 
of surrogates and guardians in protecting the patient’s best 
interests. 
 
 
Cases 
 
The following cases illustrate different cultures and 
approaches to treatment at the end-of-life, the importance 
of family in decision-making processes and the 
significance that is assigned in different countries to 
advance directives. Of the three selected countries, only 
The Netherlands currently practises euthanasia. 
 
Spring 
 
Earl Spring was an incompetent patient whose wife 
Blanche Spring petitioned the Court for an order that 
hemodialysis treatments, which were sustaining the life of 
Mr Spring, be terminated. Blanche and Earl Spring were 
married for more than fifty-five years. Their son Robert 
had lived nearby his parents’ home and had visited them 
virtually every day. Mrs. Spring and Robert Spring had 
been active participants in caring for Mr. Spring’s needs 
since the onset of his precipitous physical and mental 
deterioration. The burden that Mr. Spring had imposed 
upon his family after he developed renal failure was 
cumbersome. Blanche and Robert Spring had to transport 
Mr. Spring three times a week to a private nephrology 
center in another town for five hours of dialysis treatment 
[3]. Furthermore, Mr. Spring’s physical deterioration was 
accompanied by mental disorientation. His behavior at 
home became somewhat belligerent and destructive and he 
could no longer care for himself. The crisis in the family 
had increased when Mrs. Spring suffered a stroke, 
temporarily losing her ability to speak. Robert Spring 
attributed the stroke to strain and exhaustion resulting from 
his father’s behavior and condition. After some six months, 
Mrs. Spring became well enough to be discharged from the 
hospital to her home. However, she could no longer take 
care of her husband and needed to devote all of her 
energies to taking care of herself [3]. 
At that time Mr. Spring was in a nursing home. His 
disruptive behavior was controlled through heavy sedation. 
Mrs. Spring and Robert Spring said that if Mr. Spring was 
competent to voice his opinion, he would wish to have 
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dialysis discontinued although that would result in his 
death. That view did not rest on any expression of such an 
intention by the patient. Nevertheless, the patient’s family 
view was accepted by the Court.  
 
Wendland 
 
Advance Directives should be as clear and precise as 
possible. Speculation should be avoided, given that it 
might prove detrimental to the patient’s best interest. Here, 
Wendland v. Wendland is a case in point [4]. 
In 1993, Robert Wendland was involved in a car 
accident while driving under the influence of alcohol. The 
accident left him brain damaged, immobile, and dependent 
on artificial nutrition and hydration. At the same time, he 
was minimally conscious. While Mr. Wendland was 
undergoing therapy, his wife Rose Wendland authorized 
surgery three times to replace dislodged feeding tubes. 
When physicians sought her permission a fourth time, she 
declined. She discussed the decision with her daughters 
and with Mr. Wendland’s brother Michael Wendland, all 
of whom believed that the patient would not have approved 
the procedure even if necessary to sustain his life. Rose 
Wendland also discussed the decision with Mr. 
Wendland’s treating physician, Dr. Kass, with other 
physicians, and with the hospital’s ombudsman, all of 
whom supported her decision [5]. Mr. Wendland’s mother 
and sister issued a lawsuit to prevent the implementation of 
the decision. 
Rose Wendland was her husband’s conservator, 
meaning that she had authority to make medical decisions 
for him. However, after a lengthy legal battle, the Supreme 
Court of California held that Rose Wendland had failed to 
show clear and convincing evidence that Robert Wendland 
would, under the circumstances, want to die. The Court 
emphasized that the clear and convincing evidence test 
requires a finding of high probability, based on evidence, 
“so clear as to leave no substantial doubt” [and] 
“sufficiently strong to command the unhesitating assent of 
every reasonable mind” [4]. If there is no valid healthcare 
directive, there must be clear and convincing evidence of 
both wishes and the patient’s best interest. The Supreme 
Court of California concluded that the superior court 
“correctly required the conservator to prove, by clear and 
convincing evidence, either that the conservatee wished to 
refuse life-sustaining treatment, or that to withhold such 
treatment would have been in his best interest; lacking 
such evidence, the superior court correctly denied the 
conservator’s request for permission to withdraw artificial 
hydration and nutrition” [4]. Consequently, the Court 
sustained the injunction to keep Robert Wendland alive. 
 
In Re N [6] 
 
N, a 68-year-old woman, was diagnosed with multiple 
sclerosis in 1991. Since 2007 she was provided with 
nutrition, fluids and medication through a tube. In 2015, 
N’s daughter (M) appealed to The Court of Protection to 
stop her mother’s life-sustaining treatment, arguing that 
her mother, who was in a minimally conscious state, had 
no quality of life as Mrs N would have perceived it. M told 
the court that continuing treatment at this stage would be 
against her mother's wishes. She said: 
 
“My mum’s immaculate appearance, the importance she 
placed on maintaining her dignity and how she lived her 
life to its fullest is what formed her belief system, it's 
what she lived for. All of that is gone now, and, very 
sadly, my mum has suffered profound humiliations and 
indignity for so many years. I cannot emphasise enough 
how much the indignity of her current existence is the 
greatest contradiction to how she thrived on life and, had 
she been able to express this, then without a doubt she 
would” [7]. 
 
The Court of Protection authorised the request. Mr 
Justice Hayden ruled that treatment could be stopped after 
hearing evidence from medical experts as well as the 
woman’s family. The judge decided that withdrawing the 
life-sustaining treatment was in the woman’s best interests 
given her current quality of life [6]. 
Justice Hayden highlighted the observations of Baroness 
Hale in Aintree University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v 
James and others [2013] which emphasised that, in 
considering the patient’s best interests, decision-makers must 
look at his medical, social and psychological welfare, the 
nature of the medical treatment, what it involves, the 
prospects of success and the likely treatment outcomes; “they 
must try and put themselves in the place of the individual 
patient and ask what his attitude to the treatment is or would 
be likely to be and they must consult others who are looking 
after him or interested in his welfare, in particular for their 
view of what his attitude would be” [8]. 
Justice Hayden, who said that his initial assumption was 
that “an instinct for life beats strongly in all human beings” 
[6], became convinced after hearing N’s family that “Mrs. N 
would have found her circumstances to be profoundly 
humiliating and that she would have been acutely alert to the 
distress caused to her family, which she would very much 
have wanted to avoid” [6]. Expert witnesses testified that 
Mrs. N had no opportunity to achieve any kind of 
rehabilitation or recovery however limited. Thus, Justice 
Hayden was “entirely satisfied” that there was no prospect of 
“her achieving a life that she would consider to be 
meaningful, worthwhile or dignified” [6]. He concluded that 
N’s wishes, “so thoughtfully presented by her family”, 
coupled with the intrusive nature of the treatment and its 
minimal potential to achieve any medical objective, rebut any 
presumption of continuing to promote life. Quite simply, 
Justice Hayden wrote, “I have come to the conclusion that it 
would be disrespectful to Mrs. N to preserve her further in a 
manner I think she would regard as grotesque” [6]. 
Justice Hayden relied heavily on N’s family who 
expressed a consensus opinion that her life was not worth 
living. At the end, no one stood by N to protect her right to 
life. N was a lonely woman. It is disconcerting to read that 
N “suffered profound humiliations and indignity for so 
many years”. Undoubtedly, the family statements left a 
very strong impression in the minds of the Official 
Solicitor and the judge; compelling enough for them to 
abandon the presumption for life in favour of death. 
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In Re 62-year-old Woman 
 
In another case in the UK, a 62-year-old woman who was 
severely disabled with arthritis, arrived at the hospital 
emergency department after taking a drug overdose with 
suicidal intent [9]. The patient left a suicide note and her 
husband presented clinicians with an advance directive 
stating that she did not want life-sustaining treatment. 
However, the advance directive had been made five years 
earlier, after the patient’s parents died in an intensive care 
unit. The suicide attempt appeared to be precipitated by a 
recent acute deterioration of her arthritis [9].  
The patient’s husband emphasised that although the 
family would ideally want her advance directive followed, 
they would support any actions and treatment taken by the 
healthcare team [9]. The husband and other relatives 
testified that the patient repeatedly told them that she did 
not want to be admitted to intensive care. 
Although the advance directive was deemed valid and 
consistent with the patient’s beliefs and values, the clinical 
team decided to ignore it and to provide the patient with 
care. The reasons for the decision were fivefold: 
 
• A delay in treatment regardless of the ultimate 
decision would prejudice the outcome. 
 
• The advance directive did not specifically 
address the present situation.  
 
• There was uncertainty about the patient’s state of 
mind at the time of her taking the overdose.  
 
• Her condition was likely to respond to treatment.  
 
• It was felt that the risk of adverse consequences 
resulting from treatment was small [9].   
 
At the six-month follow-up after discharge, the patient 
was grateful that the staff had acted in her best interests, 
but maintained that in view of her poor future prospects, 
she would rather have had her wishes respected [10]. But 
her wishes were not unequivocal. The medical team opted 
to act cautiously and to err on the side of life. The family 
did not wish to insist on any decision and left the final 
judgment in the hands of the medical team whose 
reasoning was perfectly logical and in the spirit of British 
medicine to maintain life whenever possible. Medical 
culture is of critical importance, as the next case 
exemplifies.   
 
Dutch Alzheimer patient 
 
This case concerns an elderly patient (70-80-year-old) with 
Alzheimer's disease in The Netherlands. Mrs A observed 
her mother deteriorate from dementia and she said she did 
not want to go through that herself. She was fearful of 
developing dementia [11,12]. After she was diagnosed as a 
patient with dementia, she explicated her wish not to be 
placed in a nursing home and separated from her beloved 
husband. Instead, she said that she preferred euthanasia 
[11,12]. Mrs A drafted advance directives in which she 
stated that she wished to have voluntary euthanasia when 
she is still mentally competent and no longer able to live at 
home with her husband [11,12]. This was four years prior 
to her death, shortly after receiving the dementia diagnosis, 
but when she was still competent [11]. 
Two and a half years later, Mrs A revised her advanced 
directives, saying: “I want to make use of the legal right to 
undergo euthanasia whenever I think the time is right for 
this” [11]. This revised phrasing is significantly different 
from her previous advance directive, where she wrote: “I 
want to make use of the legal right to undergo voluntary 
euthanasia when I am still at all mentally competent and 
am no longer able to live at home with my husband” [11]. 
It should be noted that Mrs A never expressed a wish for 
euthanasia to the family physician, even when she was 
explicitly given an opportunity to do so by her physician 
[11]. 
Mrs A’s husband took care for her until the last six 
months of her life. Seven weeks prior to her death, Mrs A 
was admitted to a nursing home because the husband could 
no longer take care of her at home [11,12]. The geriatrician 
in charge then met Mrs A for the first time, but did not 
speak to her. Instead, she spoke extensively with Mrs A’s 
husband. On that occasion, the husband asked the nursing 
home geriatrician to implement Mrs A’s euthanasia request 
based on her written advance directive. The geriatrician 
decided to adopt a more cautious route, giving Mrs A one 
month to accommodate herself to the new environment and 
then make a decision [11,12]. 
During the seven-week period that Mrs A stayed in the 
nursing home, the geriatrician observed the patient 
frequently and spoke to her for a long time. While Mrs A 
regularly told the care providers that she wanted to die, she 
did not ask for euthanasia. The physician thought that Mrs 
A no longer understood the words “euthanasia” and 
“death” [11]. When she was asked several times whether 
she wanted to die, Mrs A replied: “But not just now, it’s 
not so bad yet!” [11]. Mrs A also regularly said “I don’t 
want to die” [11].   
Mrs A was unhappy in the nursing home. She was 
lonely, fearful, angry and restless, at time also violent 
[11,13]. Mrs A missed her husband. She enjoyed his 
company when he visited her and became edgy and sad 
when he left the nursing home. The husband visited Mrs A 
in the nursing home for two hours every day [11]. The 
geriatrician thought that Mrs A suffered unbearably as she 
was fine only when her husband and others visited her and 
showed clear signs of distress when she was alone. 
Furthermore, the geriatrician thought that the situation was 
hopeless and that euthanasia was therefore appropriate 
[11]. 
Once the geriatrician made the decision that euthanasia 
for Mrs A was appropriate, she consulted two physicians. 
Upon examination, both concluded that Mrs A suffered 
hopelessly and intolerably and that the legal criteria for 
euthanasia were met [12]. The first consultant observed the 
patient, had a brief meeting with her and spoke with Mrs 
A’s husband and with her former family physician. She 
concluded that Mrs A was mentally incompetent and no 
longer capable of clearly expressing her wishes [11]. 
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Therefore, Mrs A’s advance directives should be honoured. 
In her report, partly based on the conversation with Mrs 
A’s husband, the consultant concluded that the due 
diligence requirement was met [11]. 
The second consultant observed the patient, spoke with 
her and with her husband, their adult child, as well as with 
the patient’s former family doctor. He agreed with the first 
consultant that Mrs A was incompetent and could no 
longer express clear requests, including euthanasia request. 
He also thought that Mrs A’s advance directives should be 
honoured [11]. The second consultant was less sure 
whether Mrs A suffered intolerably. When he visited her, 
she appeared cheerful and satisfied [11]. But when the 
consultant watched videos of Mrs A, especially the 
heartbreaking scenes when her husband left the nursing 
home after visitation, he reached the conclusion that the 
loss of control caused Mrs A intolerable suffering [11]. 
On the morning of the euthanasia, Mrs A was not 
aware that this was her last day. The geriatrician later 
explained that there was no point holding such a 
conversation as Mrs A was incompetent. Raising the issue 
would “only interfere with the process” [11]. She thought 
that Mrs A might object to euthanasia [11]. As the 
physician thought that there might be a struggle, she 
decided to reduce Mrs A’s consciousness. The physician 
put a sedative in Mrs A’s coffee without informing her 
[11]. After Mrs A was in a state of reduced consciousness, 
a paramedic inserted an infusion line and the geriatrician 
injected thiopental; at which point, Mrs A tried to get up. 
Strikingly, the patient’s family helped to hold her back and 
the physician quickly administered the rest of the 
thiopental and subsequently also a dose of a neuromuscular 
blocker [11,14]. The physician did not stop when Mrs A 
resisted because she did not think that it was “appropriate 
to halt termination of life,” as euthanasia had been 
discussed for a while and the physician did not want the 
patient to “get cold feet” [15]. 
The geriatrician reported to the euthanasia review 
committee that the patient was not competent and therefore 
her wishes at the time of euthanasia were irrelevant. Even 
if Mrs A were to say: “No, I do not wish to die”, the 
geriatrician would still continue with the euthanasia [11]. 
Apparently, Mrs A’s husband was afraid that the 
euthanasia would not take place. He reassured himself that 
this was what his wife wanted [11,12]. The geriatrician 
acted as she did with the support of the family. If Mrs A’s 
husband would have objected to his wife’s euthanasia, then 
it is plausible to assume that the geriatrician would not 
have performed euthanasia. 
The case gained notoriety because the Regional 
Euthanasia Review Committee did not think that the due 
diligence requirement was met. They concluded that the 
physician who performed the euthanasia failed to follow 
the Dutch statutory guidelines for euthanasia. While the 
euthanasia review committee thought that the physician 
could have reasonably concluded that Mrs A was suffering 
hopelessly and unbearably, that there were no other 
reasonable options, and that the physician appropriately 
consulted two experts, the Committee also thought that the 
physician failed to exercise due care [11,12]. 
The Committee thought that the answer to the question 
of whether the patient wanted her written advance 
directives to replace her oral request was doubtful. The 
review committee observed that the patient never uttered a 
verbal request for euthanasia [11]. Therefore, it would 
have been prudent to maintain the more restrictive reading 
of Mrs A’s dementia clause in her directives. The 
euthanasia request must be voluntary and well-considered 
and this was not the case here [11].  
Furthermore, the committee felt that the geriatrician 
crossed the line in administering Dormicum, the euthanasia 
drug, in a deceitful way, without the patient’s consent and 
by not stopping the euthanasia process when the patient 
responded negatively [11,16]. By sedating Mrs A, the 
physician wished to neutralise any objection. The 
Committee argued that the physician should not have 
continued with the implementation during which the 
patient had to be restrained and that any duress and even 
the appearance of duress must be prevented at any cost 
[11,17].  
Consequently, the doctor involved was formally 
reprimanded for performing the euthanasia without the 
patient’s proper consent [18]. The Committee 
recommended that the case should go to Court to clarify 
whether the doctor acted properly [19]. The Committee felt 
there was a need for judicial clarity regarding the powers a 
doctor has when it comes to the euthanasia of patients 
suffering from severe dementia [20]. 
 
 
Discussion 
 
This discussion is divided to three parts. In the first part I 
discuss the role of the family in the decision-making 
processes concerning the above patients, while the second 
part examines the role of Advance Directives (ADs) at the 
end of life. The third part discusses surrogacy and 
guardianship. 
 
Role of Family 
 
The first case, Spring, illustrates a tragic situation in which 
the patient’s wellbeing comes into conflict with the 
family’s wellbeing. This presents a conflict of interest that 
was resolved by discontinuing Mr Spring’s treatment and 
shortening his life. It seems that the Spring family was, 
indeed, a close-knit family unit. One gets the impression 
that Mrs. Spring and Robert Spring loved Earl Spring. 
They found it terribly distressing to see the man they had 
shared their lives with for so many years fading away, 
failing to recognize them, acting brutally and becoming a 
different person. They could not cope with this situation. 
The appeal to the court was made also in order to keep 
their own sanity, their own lives. It seems that Mrs. Spring 
and Robert Spring sincerely thought that by withholding 
treatment from Earl Spring, they preserved his dignity. The 
question remains whether Mr. Spring himself would have 
preferred to die.  
It is argued that even if we are convinced of the 
family’s commitment to the patient, we should not see the 
family’s position as obligatory in all circumstances. The 
family’s role should be held as a prominent consideration, 
but we should take into account first and foremost the best 
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interests of the patient. The family is not necessarily 
capable of rational decision-making, especially under such 
stressed circumstances and even if it is, its interests are not 
necessarily identical to the interests of the patient. The 
patient’s best interests should always be first and foremost 
in our mind [21-24].  
The above cases illustrate that continuous strain 
inflicted upon close family members might bring them to 
decide that treatment should discontinue. The strain might 
be multi-dimensional: physical, emotional, psychological 
and financial [25,26]. In the Wendland case, Robert 
Wendland had two close family members who questioned 
the decision-making process, insisting that death was not in 
the patient’s best interests. It might have been in the best 
interests of his wife who found it difficult to cope. It is 
reasonable to assume that the family dispute brought about 
the decision to continue treatment. If the family were to 
exhibit a unified stand to cease treatment, then no one 
would have questioned the non-treatment decision and the 
patient’s life would then be shortened. 
In all cases but in Re 62-year-old Woman, the families 
had strong views about what should the medical staff do 
with regard to their relative. In Re 62-year-old Woman the 
family expressed an opinion but left the decision in the 
hands of the medical staff. They did not wish to take 
responsibility for the outcomes resulting from any course 
of action and thought that medical staff are better equipped 
to weigh the various options and to make a decision. 
As for the Dutch patient: As in previous cases 
discussed supra, the patient’s family found itself in an 
impossible situation. Mrs A could no longer be treated at 
home. Her exhausted husband was unable to provide the 
care she needed. Her situation required an alternative 
solution: a nursing home, the solution that Mrs A dreaded. 
The review committee wrote that Mrs A’s husband was “a 
very gentle man” who found his wife’s farewell 
frightening [11]. He was overwhelmed by her placement in 
a nursing home and felt guilty. However, the situation at 
home escalated to such an extent that he was at risk of 
collapsing [11]. The husband was mainly afraid that the 
euthanasia would not take place. After his wife was 
euthanised, he gave the family physician the impression 
that the termination of his wife’s life occurred calmly [11]. 
He did not wish to share the drama. 
Mrs A’s story exemplifies the difficulty of entertaining 
euthanasia for incompetent patients [27]. Her family 
physician, who knew her for years, met with Mrs A and 
her husband a few months prior to her death. At that time, 
Mrs A could no longer understand the concept of 
euthanasia. When the physician explained what euthanasia 
means, Mrs A said that she did not want it. The husband 
then reminded her that she did not want to be admitted to a 
nursing home and Mrs A replied that in that case she might 
want euthanasia. The physician explained that she would 
receive an injection and would not wake up. Then Mrs A 
said that this “was going too far” [27]. Mrs A could not 
determine what was worse for her: a nursing home or 
euthanasia and she was no longer competent to make a 
decision. Her dementia had relinquished her autonomy and 
thus a decision had to be made for her. Her advance 
directives were open to the interpretations of family and 
medical professionals. It is doubtful whether their 
interpretation to terminate Mrs A’s life, especially in the 
way the euthanasia act had manifested itself, was in 
accordance with what Mrs A wished for.  
 
Advance Directives 
 
Advance Directives (ADs) are often made without the 
opportunities for fully informed consent. On what basis did 
the patient make the decision that she would not want to be 
treated? The decision not to receive treatment should be 
based on a clear understanding of the situation. It is 
essential that the patient understands the disorder, the 
available alternatives and her chances and risks. This can 
be rather complicated when the physicians themselves do 
not have a clear picture about the condition and cannot 
provide a reliable prognosis.  
Furthermore, there are valid concerns about the 
patient’s opportunity to change her mind, the potential for 
scientific developments and the clarity of the advance 
directive. In a patient who is mentally alert and who makes 
a decision not to receive treatment, there is always the 
opportunity for the clinician to consider with the patient 
the reason for the decision in light of the particular clinical 
features. The clinician also has the opportunity to discuss 
with the patient why she does not want treatment. Is it fear 
of pain, loss of dignity, concern for others or any other 
reason? In these circumstances, the clinician is in a better 
position to ensure that the patient has thought out the 
decision carefully. This possibility is removed when faced 
with an AD and an incompetent patient [28,29].  
As for the potential for scientific progress, competent 
patients have the advantage of making their decision based 
on up-to-date knowledge. Advance directives may be made 
many years prior to the time of their implementation, a 
period during which new treatment or changes in quality of 
life opportunities may have occurred. In addition, ADs are 
not always clear about the patient’s intentions. A leading 
British physician, Keith Andrews, testifies that he saw an 
AD stating that if the person developed severe brain 
damage she would not want to continue living. There was 
no statement as to whether this decision was to be made on 
the first day or after a period of several days/weeks/months 
to give the patient opportunity of recovery. The general 
statement about severe brain damage gives wide latitude 
for widely differing views, even among clinicians 
experienced in the management of brain damage [28].  
In England and Wales, the Mental Capacity Act (MCA) 
(2005) enshrines the concept of autonomy. It holds that if a 
person has made an advance decision which is valid and 
applicable to a treatment, the decision has effect as if he 
had made it, and had capacity to make it, at the time when 
the question arises whether the treatment should be carried 
out or continued. Section 26 (2) of the Act maintains that a 
person does not incur liability for carrying out or 
continuing the treatment unless, at the time, he is satisfied 
that an advance decision exists which is valid and 
applicable to the treatment. Section 26 (3) provides that a 
person does not incur liability for the consequences of 
withholding or withdrawing a treatment from a patient if, 
at the time, he reasonably believes that an advance 
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decision exists which is valid and applicable to the 
treatment [30]. 
In Aintree University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust 
v James, [8] Lady Hale, who delivered the opinion of the 
Court, wrote that a physician cannot be forced to provide 
treatment that is not clinically indicated for a patient and, 
conversely, a doctor cannot lawfully provide treatment that 
is not in the patient’s best interests. The key question 
concerns as to how to determine what is in a patient’s best 
interests. Lady Hale maintained: 
 
“ … in considering the best interests of this particular 
patient at this particular time, decision-makers must look 
at his welfare in the widest sense, not just medical but 
social and psychological; they must consider the nature 
of the medical treatment in question, what it involves 
and its prospects of success; they must consider what the 
outcome of that treatment for the patient is likely to be; 
they must try and put themselves in the places of the 
individual patient and ask what his attitude to the 
treatment is or would be likely to be; and they must 
consult others who are looking after him or interested in 
his welfare, in particular for their view of what his 
attitude would be” [8]. 
 
For the first time, the Court ruled that if it is in a 
mentally incapacitated person’s best interests, it would be 
lawful for life-sustaining medical treatment to be withheld. 
Lady Hale stressed that, in accordance with the MCA, 
consultation with carers and others interested in the 
patient’s welfare as to what would be in his best interests 
and in particular what his own views would have been is 
paramount [8]. 
In the Netherlands I have seen ADs saying: “I'd like to 
die upon the stage when I don't recognize my children” 
[31,32]. This phrasing is far too vague and too sweeping to 
serve as a guideline. It provides healthcare professionals 
with wide latitude for interpretation that might not always 
be in tandem with the patient’s best interests. Medical 
conditions are varied and complex. ADs that are usually 
phrased in general terms might be ill-suited to serve as 
guidelines to follow. We also saw that in both in Re 62-
year-old Woman, and in the case of the Dutch Alzheimer 
patient, the advance directives were open to interpretations 
and, in the case of Mrs A, it was unclear whether the 
patient was adequately competent when she revised them.  
Mrs A’s revised advance directives stated: “I want to 
make use of the legal right to undergo euthanasia whenever 
I think the time is right for this” [11]. It is reasonable to 
deduce that Mrs A thought that she herself would request 
euthanasia at the time of her choice. Therefore, it would 
have been prudent to adopt a more restrictive reading of 
the advance directive. The geriatrician should have 
prioritised Mrs A’s statements that she was not ready to die 
over the earlier advance directives.  
During the seven-week period that Mrs A stayed in the 
nursing home, the geriatrician observed the patient 
frequently and spoke to her for a long time. While Mrs A 
regularly told the care providers that she wanted to die, she 
did not ask for euthanasia. The physician thought that Mrs 
A no longer understood the words “euthanasia” and 
“death” [11]. When she was asked several times whether 
she wanted to die, Mrs A replied: “But not just now, it’s 
not so bad yet!” [11]. Mrs A also regularly said “I don’t 
want to die” [11]. Still, the physician decided to honour the 
family’s request rather than the patient’s life.   
In his book Life’s Dominion, Ronald Dworkin made 
two pertinent distinctions. The first is between good life 
and biological life. A “good life” is a normative concept 
whereas biological life refers to bodily functions. Clearly, 
a life of biological existence alone does not encompass the 
full meaning of life. But it may still be a life worth living. 
Dworkin did not think so. Dworkin argued that there is no 
point in continuing to “live” when only a body remains, 
without autonomy and spirit [33]. 
The second distinction is between experiential and 
critical interests. By experiential interests Dworkin 
referred to pleasure and enjoyment in virtue of desires and 
ambitions. Critical interests refer to our wish to live 
worthwhile lives [33]. Dworkin emphasized the notion of 
dignity. Dignity is the central aspect of the intrinsic 
importance of human life [33-35]. A person’s right to be 
treated with dignity involves the expectation that others 
acknowledge his or her critical interests: that they 
recognize that he or she has a moral standing and that it is, 
intrinsically, objectively important how his or her life goes. 
Now, Mrs A had a critical interest in having a family. This 
critical interest was connected to her convictions about the 
intrinsic value of her own life. Mrs A did not wish to be in 
a nursing home, dependent on others. Dworkin wrote that 
many people do not want to be remembered living in 
circumstances perceived by them as degrading. At least 
part of what people fear about dependence is its impact not 
on those responsible for their care, but on their own 
dignity. Dworkin contended that some people are horrified 
that their death might express an idea which they detest as 
a perversion: that mere biological life - just hanging on - 
has independent value [33]. 
Dworkin contemplated a case where a person named 
Margo had executed a formal document directing that if 
she should develop Alzheimer’s disease or any other life-
threatening disease, she should be killed as soon and as 
painlessly as possible. Dworkin asked whether autonomy 
requires that her wishes be respected when she is ill, even 
though she seems perfectly happy with ‘her dog-eared 
mysteries, the single painting she repaints, and her peanut-
butter-and-jelly sandwiches’. In such a case, an apparent 
contradiction seems to exist between past and present 
wishes, between past and present autonomy. Dworkin 
endorsed respecting Margo’s past wishes, arguing that a 
competent person making an advance directive to provide 
for her treatment if she enters into dementia is making the 
kind of judgment that autonomy, in the integrity view, 
most respects a judgment about the overall shape of the 
kind of life she wants to have led [33]. In other words, 
Dworkin argued that a life that is lacking critical interests 
is a poor life in terms of its quality. What we seek is not 
just any form of life, but rather life in earnest. Dworkin 
would probably think that the physician was justified to 
euthanise Mrs A. He showed little respect to life that lacks 
intellect [33]. 
Contrary to Dworkin’s arguments, in The Right to Die 
with Dignity I contended that even the thin pleasure of 
peanut butter and jelly is worthwhile [32]. Evidence shows 
that many people who reach the stage of permanent 
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dementia and live non-autonomous lives nevertheless hang 
on to life and find pleasure in things that had no 
importance for them in the past [36-38]. Despite what we 
would expect, older adults with dementia do not focus on 
the disease when talking about their happiness. Some 
patients with dementia suffer from mood and 
personality changes, but their experience of happiness 
remains firmly grounded in their social relationships. 
Becoming engaged in activity improves how they feel 
about themselves, especially when activities are 
accompanied with music [39,40]. This explains why Mrs A 
said, when asked whether she wished to die: “But not just 
now, it’s not so bad yet!” [11]. Some months before she 
thought that the nursing home would be horrible, but after 
she was admitted to the nursing home she thought that the 
situation was bearable.  
Therefore, I argue that her present order of priorities 
should win over past considerations. Dworkin seemed to 
think that one’s directives are predetermined and 
unchangeable, but this is not necessarily the case. We are 
not able to know how our lives will look when we are 
about to die. We are not able to say that values and 
priorities that are important to us now will be as important 
to us until the very last day. The notion of an 
unchangeable, unified personality, is clearly doubtful. 
People do change and these changes may become 
meaningful to us in circumstances that we cannot envisage. 
Indeed, the very idea of autonomy reflects our ability and 
desire to construct and reshape realities, to re-evaluate 
values and ideas, to renounce old beliefs and to 
accommodate ourselves to new situations.  
Dworkin assumed that people, as rational agents, may 
have certain attitudes regarding dementia and decide 
beforehand that some forms of life are repugnant, 
meaningless and not worth living. However, for many 
people, the life of intellect is not as important as it was for 
Dworkin. Indeed, many people are not self-assured of their 
future wishes as Dworkin was. People try to assess how 
their situation might look in the future and decide on their 
destiny according to the data they currently have on the 
demented state. Many people do not possess the same 
capacity of assessment that Dworkin was fortunate to have. 
Moreover, people are not only thinking creatures. Not all 
factors can be grasped by our rational faculties. Not all 
data can be assimilated by applying reason and judgment. 
Sometimes, we do things we could not imagine doing. 
Sometimes people act in accordance with their sentiments, 
rather than their intellect. As a consequence, people are 
pushed to do some things by their instincts and impulses, 
factors that they find difficult to explain in rational terms. 
On some occasions people are overpowered and 
overwhelmed by the reality that confronts them. Here, they 
accommodate themselves to situations that have been 
imposed on them. 
We should acknowledge that a person’s priorities are 
not always fixed, and, therefore, we should not renounce 
the idea of having the ability to change them. People are 
not prophets. We can appraise possibilities upon evidence, 
data and experience, but we cannot know with absolute 
certainty that these assessments will prove to be true for us. 
Following Dworkin, let us consider Mrs A who was able to 
enjoy only a small number of things, first and foremost the 
company of her family. From her previous directives it was 
understood that if the time would come and she would 
need to live outside of her home then this sparse kind of 
pleasure was not worth living for. However, upon reaching 
that stage Mrs A hung on to life and nevertheless found 
some pleasure in her limited life. Her world was filled with 
joy upon seeing her loved ones. On the other hand, no 
concrete indication was given that she wanted to depart 
from life. In such a case, the patient’s present condition 
should trump her previous advance directives. 
In coming to decide the fate of incompetent patients, 
such as those who have entered into dementia, 
consideration should be given to whether the patient’s 
condition is irreversible; whether a chance exists for 
rehabilitation of some constitutive, vital elements of 
human life; the feasibility of maintaining a reasonable 
quality of life that is of significance to the patient in 
concern; whether the patient expressed his or her desire to 
die upon reaching a certain state of living, and also 
whether we feel the patient’s current interests are similar to 
the interests he or she expressed in the past. These 
preconditions affirm values that liberals, as well as 
conservatives, so much appreciate, for example, autonomy 
and respect for the dignity of the person. Other relevant 
considerations include the opinions of physicians and of 
the patient’s family and/or guardian. The AD, together 
with family testimonials, can shed light as to whether the 
present quality of life is reasonable for the patients and of 
significance to them. The medical care team should 
consider the length of time that has passed since making 
the advance directive, changes in the patient’s condition, 
the circumstances that the patient is now in and the 
likelihood of successful treatment.  
Re 62-year-old Woman illustrates the need to refresh 
ADs so to ascertain patients’ wishes; more so when the last 
draft of the AD was made under the influence of a 
traumatic event. In the case of Mrs A, most disturbing was 
the physician’s statement that since Mrs A was no longer 
mentally competent, her utterances were irrelevant at that 
time in the physician’s opinion. Even if Mrs A had said 
prior to the implementation that she did not want to die, the 
physician stated that she would have proceeded with the 
termination of life [11]. The physician took upon herself 
the responsibility to kill a patient, although the patient, if 
asked, would have opted for life, and she denied the patient 
the opportunity to bid her loved ones farewell against the 
clear wishes of the patient. This conduct should disturb 
first and foremost the Dutch medical establishment. They 
should reflect on the consequences that the euthanasia law 
has brought about, consequences that cannot be reconciled 
with the humane motivations for euthanasia that stress first 
and foremost the dignity of the person. 
For sure, we should be wary of the impact that financial 
considerations may have in deciding the fate of the patient. 
In the US, there are fears that ADs will be utilized against 
the patient’s best interests to preclude the commitment of 
costly resources. It has been argued that advance directives 
have not fulfilled their promise of facilitating decisions 
about end-of-life care for incompetent patients. 
Furthermore, many legal requirements and restrictions 
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concerning advance directives are counterproductive [41-
44]. The advance directive must be applicable to the 
present circumstances.  
To resolve the conflict between past competent and 
current incompetent interests, it is suggested that instead of 
simply enforcing all prior directives, doctors, families and 
other people involved in the care of incompetent patients, 
should be able to examine whether the patient’s interests 
would best be served by actions contrary to the AD, in 
situations in which the incompetent patient appears to have 
an interest in further treatment and life [9,45-48].  
 
Surrogacy/Guardianship 
 
In situations such as that of Spring, where a clear conflict 
of interests arises and the patients’ family is incapable of 
making a decision for the patient that is independent of the 
family members’ own best interests, it is advisable to 
enquire whether the patient has a surrogate or to appoint a 
guardian for the patient. A surrogate is a person who has 
enjoyed the patient’s trust. The patient had thought that the 
surrogate will be able to make decisions on his behalf 
when competency is lost due to the deteriorating disease. 
The surrogate is assumed to know the patient well and to 
be familiar with his value system and preferences and to be 
a voice for the voiceless patient. Though the patient is 
silent, he has a trusted surrogate who represents his best 
interests and makes decisions as if it is the patient himself 
who makes them. A guardian is an impartial agent who 
understands the complexity of the situation and who could 
truly represent the patient’s best interests. Guardianship is 
when a Court appoints someone to have legal authority 
over the patient’s care, custody and control. Surrogate 
decision makers require support in the form of active 
information and structured communication [49,50]. 
In Re N, the patient's interests were represented by the 
Office of the Official Solicitor, which acts for people 
without mental capacity to make decisions themselves 
[51]. The Official Solicitor first held that there should be 
strong presumption supporting the continuance of life, 
stressing that there was no direct evidence as to what N 
wanted for herself and that the right judgment should take 
into account not how N presented before her current 
suffering, but whether no life at all are preferable to her 
present condition. However, after hearing N’s family 
observations, the Official Solicitor concluded that it would 
be wrong for him to continue to oppose the application [6]. 
The Official Solicitor indicated during the course of the 
hearing that he supported the application to withdraw life-
sustaining treatment, meaning that the application to cease 
treatment was not opposed by any of the parties involved 
[6]. 
This was the first time that the Court of Protection has 
agreed to withdraw treatment from someone receiving life-
sustaining treatment while considered by medical experts 
to be in a ‘minimally conscious state’. In 2011, the Court 
of Protection ruled that treatment could not be withdrawn 
from a patient in a minimally conscious state, at the 
family’s request [52]. 
When a patient like Mrs A is declared incompetent and 
decisions regarding her treatment are required, the medical 
team should have appointed a patient’s guardian to make a 
decision. Mrs A’s husband was incapable of ensuring his 
wife’s best interests, as these were conflicting with his own 
best interests. While he felt guilty for relocating his wife to 
a nursing home, he nevertheless understood that this was 
necessary. He visited his wife each and every day, but only 
for two hours. This was the right balance for himself. 
Clearly, this was not the right balance for his wife. As his 
wife’s medical condition could not have been improved, in 
fact quite the opposite, the situation became increasingly 
agonizing for him. He came to the realization that death 
was the appropriate solution for him and for his wife. It 
was wrong not to appoint a guardian in such a situation. A 
guardian could possibly have explored other solutions that 
would have served the patient’s best interests better. 
Things are relatively less complicated when the patient 
had made an AD that provides clear guidelines for the 
medical team about the course of treatment to pursue, 
including no treatment and where a surrogate or guardian 
is in agreement with the AD. In the absence of a clear 
indication of the patient’s wishes, the medical team may 
consult the surrogate or guardian, asking her what the 
patient’s choice would have been likely to be if she was 
able to utter a preference.  If the surrogate who knows the 
patient or the guardian, recently appointed to represent the 
patient, does not have sufficient knowledge about the 
patient to deduce her preferences, she/he is supposed to 
make a recommendation on the basis of her/his beliefs 
about where the patient’s best interests lie [53]. 
Sometimes, the surrogate or guardian might make a 
decision that is incompatible with the patient’s advance 
directive. The AD might be too general and the surrogate 
would claim that it does not encompass the specific 
situation in which the patient has found herself. Based on 
intimate acquaintance, the surrogate may claim insights 
that are unspecified in the AD. Then the decision as to 
whether to follow the patient’s AD or the patient’s 
surrogate opinion is left in the hands of the medical team. 
The nagging concern is whether the medical team will 
decide the case solely on the basis of what is best for the 
patient, rather than what is best for the hospital. This 
concern is justified and, presently, there is no generally 
accepted yardstick that would instruct and direct the 
decision-making process. Clinging on to the notion of the 
“patient’s best interests” might be insufficient, as these are 
not always clear-cut. People have conflicted opinions and 
might exhibit indecision when they are competent, yet the 
situation becomes far more compounded when they 
become incompetent patients.  
Suppose that the patient had voiced conflicting views 
on the use of sedation. The surrogate heard the patient 
voicing those conflicting views. The AD is silent about 
sedation. If the surrogate shares all that she heard from the 
patient, no problem arises. The problem arises when the 
surrogate shares only part of what she heard either 
intentionally or because at present she remembers only that 
part. It is also possible that the surrogate would remember 
some things because unconsciously she does not wish to 
remember certain things. Either way, the surrogate then 
does not fully represent the patient. As the surrogate’s 
intentions might not be explicit and apparent, the medical 
team is incapable gauging the extent of patient’s 
representation assumed by the surrogate.  
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Conclusions 
 
In the United States, oral statements are perceived 
sufficient to remove or to withhold life-sustaining 
treatment [54-59]. The family may play a crucial role in 
deciding the destiny of their loved ones. In re Christopher 
[60], the court relied on a conversation that was held ten 
years before the case between 79-year old Ms. Kushnir and 
her son to accept the son’s bona fide refusal to consent to 
any procedure that will prolong the patient’s life after she 
lost all cognitive functions and was in constant pain. The 
surgical insertion of a feeding tube was conceived by the 
Court under these conditions as “futile and unnecessary” 
[60,61]. Because of the weight that is accorded to the 
opinion of the patient’s family, one of the medical staff, 
arguably the social worker, should review the relationships 
between the patient and his/her family to verify that the 
family does not hold partisan interests that run counter to 
the patient’s best interests. After all, the family does not 
necessarily represent the patient’s best interests as a matter 
of course. We should always try to ascertain that those who 
are truly beloved, truly caring for the patient and those who 
are around the patient's bedside, be included within the 
decision-making process together with the medical staff 
themselves. 
Summing up the considerations that are important in 
decisions on death with dignity, my view is the following: 
if the patients are competent, their requests should be 
honoured and respected as much as it is possible. The 
situation is far more complicated when patients are 
incompetent. If patients make advance directives in the 
form of a living will, DNR order, a letter, etc., that they 
would wish to continue living, no matter what, and we 
have no reason to believe that the patients have changed 
their minds, then we should continue to respect that wish.  
In the event that patients have prepared an AD saying 
that they would prefer that all treatment be terminated 
upon reaching the last stage of their incurable disease, and 
we are uncertain about the patients’ present wishes 
because, for instance, they are incompetent, and the 
attending physicians think that the situation is irreversible, 
then we should respect the AD and let the patients die. 
When the healthcare professionals are satisfied that the 
advance directive is valid and applicable to the patient’s 
condition in the current circumstances, then it should be 
followed [47,53].  
For people with foresight who took the initiative to 
prepare ADs, asking to die upon reaching a certain 
situation, death is not the worst situation one can be in 
when compared to being on the verge of death and then 
stabilized without hope of ever really getting better. 
Patients who suffer from incurable diseases (such as 
cancer) may feel that their lives become transient and that 
the thought of death brings them more comfort than alarm. 
They may feel that their dignity, their autonomy, their 
humanity, are better served by letting them die. The 
patient’s wish, in this context, must be respected. This is 
especially true if the patient has emphasized beforehand 
that her dignity cannot be separated from consideration of 
her loved people. For some patients, knowledge of the 
anguish their condition imposes on their families is such a 
heavy burden that they prefer to die and not be 
remembered in their diminished condition. This, of course, 
is not the sole consideration, but a significant additional 
consideration that needs to be taken fully into account.  
If no ADs are available, then we should ask the advice 
of the patients’ families who should know the patients 
better than anyone else. If the patients’ loved ones believe 
the patients would want to be kept alive, then we should 
respect their decision, even if the attending physicians 
disagree. In the event that the patients’ family wish to 
withhold treatment, and the attending physicians think 
there is still a hope of recovery, then we have to respect the 
physicians’ decision. The patients’ best interests require 
erring on the side of life. 
In the event that the patients’ family wishes to and the 
attending physicians believe the patients’ condition will 
only deteriorate, and that that condition negates their 
dignity, the best interests of the patients require allowing 
the patients to die. Here, the best interests of the patients, 
not those of the family, the physician, the hospital, or the 
Society at large, are and remain, paramount. 
 
 
Acknowledgments and Conflicts of 
Interest 
 
I am grateful to Deputy President (ret.) of the Israel 
Supreme Court, Justice Eliyahu Mazza, Dan Callahan, 
Shimon Glick and Scott Kim for their most constructive 
remarks. I declare no conflicts of interest. 
 
 
References 
 
[1] The President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical 
Problems and Biomedical and Behavioral Research. 
(1983). Deciding to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment, p. 
28. Available at: 
https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/
10822/559344/deciding_to_forego_tx.pdf?sequence=1 
[2] Rawls, J. (1973). A Theory of Justice, p.209. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
[3] In the Matter of Spring, Mass. App. 399 N.E.2d 493 
(1979). Available at: 
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2123413/in-the-
matter-of-spring/? 
[4] Wendland v. Wendland,26 Cal. 4th 519, 28 P.3d 151 
(2001). Available at: 
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2525487/conservat
orship-of-wendland/  
[5] Visser, M., Deliens, L. & Houttekier, D. (2014). 
Physician-related Barriers to Communication and Patient- 
and Family-centred Decision-making towards the End of 
Life in Intensive Care: a systematic review. Critical Care 
18 (6) 604. 
[6] Re N. (2015). EWCOP 76. Available at: 
https://www.familylawweek.co.uk/site.aspx?i=ed151582. 
Cohen-Almagor 
 
End of life care 
 
464 
[7] Mitchell, I. (2015). Court approves withdrawal of 
treatment in landmark end-of-life case. Family Law (20 
November 2015). Available at: 
http://www.familylaw.co.uk/news_and_comment/court-
approves-withdrawal-of-treatment-in-landmark-end-of-
life-case#.Vr4I2liLS70 
[8] Aintree University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v 
James and others [2013] UKSC 67; [2013] WLR (D) 421 
at para 39. Available at: 
https://www.39essex.com/cop_cases/aintree-university-
hospitals-nhs-foundation-trust-respondent-v-james-
appellant/ 
[9] Bonner, S., Tremlet, M. & Bell, D. (2009). Are 
Advance Directives Legally Binding or Simply the Starting 
Point for a Discussion on Patients’ Best Interests. British 
Medical Journal 339, b4667. 
[10] Szawarski, P. (2013). Classic Cases Revisited: The 
suicide of Kerry Wooltorton. Journal of the Intensive Care 
Society 14 (3) 213-214. 
[11] Judgement 2016 - 85 of the Regional Review 
Committee regarding the notification of termination of life 
on request by specialist in geriatrics.  
[12] Gibbes Miller, D., Dresser, R. & Kim, S.Y.H. (2019). 
Advance Euthanasia Directives: a controversial case and 
its ethical implication. Journal of Medical Ethics 45 (2) 
84-89.  
[13] “Doctor reprimanded for ‘overstepping mark’ during 
euthanasia on dementia patient”. Dutch News (29 January 
2017). Available at: 
http://www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2017/01/doctor-
reprimanded-for-overstepping-mark-during-euthanasia-on-
dementia-patient/ 
[14] Rachel Roberts, “Doctor who asked dementia patient's 
family to hold her down while she gave lethal injection 
cleared”. The Independent (5 February 2017). Available at: 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/doctor-
netherlands-lethal-injection-dementia-euthanasia-
a7564061.html 
[15] Nancy Flory, “Dutch Woman With Alzheimers 
Euthanized - Even After She Changed Her Mind”. Stream 
(14 February 2017). Available at: https://stream.org/dutch-
woman-with-alzheimers-euthanized-even-after-she-
changed-her-mind/ 
[16] Janene Pieters, “Euthanasia controversy: Doctor 
rebuked for helping uncertain woman die”, NL Times (26 
January 2017). Available at: 
https://nltimes.nl/2017/01/26/euthanasia-controversy-
doctor-rebuked-helping-uncertain-woman-die 
[17] “Doctor reprimanded for ‘overstepping mark’ during 
euthanasia on dementia patient”, Dutch News (29 January 
2017). Available at: 
http://www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2017/01/doctor-
reprimanded-for-overstepping-mark-during-euthanasia-on-
dementia-patient/ 
[18] Simon Caldwell, “Dutch euthanasia regulator quits 
over dementia killings”. Catholic Herald (23 January 
2018). Available at: 
http://catholicherald.co.uk/news/2018/01/23/dutch-
euthanasia-regulator-quits-over-dementia-killings/ 
[19] Michael Cook, “Struggling woman with dementia 
euthanised in Netherlands”. BioEdge (4 February 2017). 
Available at: 
https://www.bioedge.org/bioethics/struggling-woman-
with-dementia-euthanised-in-netherlands/12173 
[20] Andrew Gregory, “Euthanasia patient fought back as 
doctor tried to give her lethal injection”. The Mirror  (28 
January 2017). Available at:  
https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/euthanasia-
patient-fought-back-doctor-9707709 
[21] John Hardwig, “What About the Family?”, The 
Hastings Center Report, Vol. 20, No. 2 (March/April 
1990): 5-10, and Is There A Duty to Die? (NY: Routledge, 
2000).  
[22] Richman, J. (1987). Sanctioned Assisting Suicide: 
Impact on Family Relations. Issues in Law and Medicine 3 
(1) 53-63.  
[23] Jennings, B. (1992). Last Rights: Dying and the 
Limits of Self-Sovereignty. In Depth 2 (3) 103-118.  
[24] Kushner, T. (Ed.). (2010). Surviving Health Care: A 
Manual for Patients and Their Families. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
[25] Pivodic, L., Van den Block, L., Pardon, K., Miccinesi, 
G. et al. (2014). Burden on Family Carers and Care-related 
Financial Strain at the End of Life: a cross-national 
population-based study. European Journal of Public 
Health 24 (5) 819-826.  
[26] Dierickx, S., Deliens, L., Cohen, J. & Chambaere, K. 
(2015). Comparison of the Expression and Granting of 
Requests for Euthanasia in Belgium in 2007 vs 2013. 
JAMA Internal Medicine 175 (10) 1703-1706. 
[27] Cohen-Almagor, R. (2016). First Do No Harm: 
Euthanasia of Patients with Dementia in Belgium. Journal 
of Medicine and Philosophy 41 (1) 74-89. 
[28] Andrews, K. (1996). Euthanasia in Chronic Severe 
Disablement. British Medical Bulletin 52 (2) 280-288.  
[29] McLean, S.A.M. (2009). Are Advance Directives 
Legally Binding or Simply the Starting Point for 
Discussion on Patient’s Best Interests? Ethical View. 
British Medical Journal 339, b4695. 
[30] Mental Capacity Act (2005), Section 26 Effect of 
advance decisions. Available at: 
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2005/9/section/26. 
[31] Cohen-Almagor, R. (2004). Euthanasia in the Neth-
erlands: The Policy and Practice of Mercy Killing. 
Dordrecht: Springer-Kluwer.  
[32] Cohen-Almagor, R. (2008). The Right to Die with 
Dignity: An Argument in Ethics, Medicine, and Law. 
Piscataway, NJ: Rutgers University Press. 
[33] Dworkin, R. (1993). Life's Dominion. pp. 222-229. 
New York: Knopf.  
[34] Rosen, M. (2012). Dignity: Its History and Meaning. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.  
[35] Sangiovanni, A. (2017). Humanity without Dignity: 
Moral Equality, Respect, and Human Rights. Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
[36] Harmer, B.J. & Orrell, M. (2008). What Is Meaningful 
Activity for People with Dementia Living in Care Homes? 
A comparison of the views of older people with dementia, 
staff and family carers. Aging & Mental Health 12 (5) 548-
558.  
[37] Person, M. & Hanssen, I. (2015). Joy, Happiness, and 
Humor in Dementia Care: a qualitative study. Creative 
Nursing 21 (1) 47-52.  
European Journal for Person Centered Healthcare 2019 Volume 7 Issue 3  
 
 
 
465 
[38] Parsons, R. (2015). A Caregiver’s Guide: Creating Joy 
and Meaning for Those with Dementia. Available at: 
https://www.alzheimers.net/5-15-15-caregivers-guide-joy-
and-meaning-for-dementia/ 
[39] Garrett, M.D. (1013). Happiness and Dementia. 
Psychology Today Available at: 
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/iage/201305/ha
ppiness-and-dementia.  
[40] Hawkins, J. (2014). Well-Being, Time, and Dementia. 
Ethics 124 (3) 507-542. 
[41] Lo, B. & Steinbrook, R. (2004). Resuscitating 
Advance Directives. Archives of Internal Medicine 164, 
1501-1506.  
[42] Fagerlin, A. & Schneider, C.E. (2004). Enough. The 
Failure of the Living Will. Hastings Center Report 34 (2) 
30-42.  
[43] End of life directives have little impact. UPI Science 
News (7 April 1997). Available at: 
https://www.upi.com/Science_News/. 
[44] Levi, B.H. & Green, M.J. (2010) Too Soon to Give 
Up: re-examining the value of advance Directives. 
American Journal of Bioethics 10 (4) 3-22. 
[45] Robertson, J.A. (1991). Second Thoughts on Living 
Wills. Hastings Center Report 21 (6) 6-9.  
[46] Advance Decisions and proxy Decision-Making in 
Medical Treatment and Research. BMA. Available at: 
https://www.bma.org.uk/advice/employment/ethics/mental
-capacity/advance-decisions-and-proxy-decision-making-
in-medical-treatment-and-research.  
[47] Davies, M. (2009). Are advance directives legally 
binding or simply the starting point for discussion on 
patients’ best interests? Legal Advice. British Medical 
Journal 339, b4693.  
[48] Mackway-Jones, K. (2009). Are advance directives 
legally binding or simply the starting point for discussion 
on patients’ best interests? Medical opinion. British 
Medical Journal 339, b4697. 
[49] Kuehlmeyer, K., Borasio, G.D. & Jox, R.J. (2012). 
How Family Caregivers' Medical and Moral Assumptions 
Influence Decision Making for Patients in the Vegetative 
State: a qualitative interview study. Journal of Medical 
Ethics 38 (6) 332-337.  
[50] Witkamp, E., Droger, M., Janssens, R.,  van Zuylen, 
L. & van der Heide, A. (2016). How to Deal With 
Relatives of Patients Dying in the Hospital? Qualitative 
Content Analysis of Relatives' Experiences. Journal of 
Pain and Symptom Management 52 (2) 235-242. 
[51] https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/official-
solicitor-and-public-trustee/about 
[52] Landmark Case in UK Court Allows Withdrawal 
of Treatment for Patient in Accordance with Family 
Wishes. Compassion in Dying Available at: 
http://compassionindying.org.uk/court-of-protection-
withdrawal-treatment-patient-family/  
[53] Brudney, D. (2009). Choosing for Another: Beyond 
Autonomy and Best Interests. Hastings Center Report 39 
(2) 31-37. 
[54] Tune v. Walter Reed Army Medical Hospital, 602 F. 
Supp. 1452 D. D.C (1985). Available at: 
https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-
courts/FSupp/602/1452/1633283/.  
[55] In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947 (Me. 1987) (Maine). 
Available at: 
https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1533144/in-re-
gardner/.  
[56] Elbaum v. Grace Plaza of Great Neck Inc., 148 
A.D.2d 244, 544 N.Y.S.2d 840 (1989). Available at: 
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/us/5914c098add7b0
49347b4b4d.  
[57] Gammon v. Albany Memorial Hospital, N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
(3 April 1989).  
[58] In re Hallahan, NO. 16338/1989, N.Y. Sup. Ct. (28 
August 1989).  
[59] In re Swan, 569 A.2d 1202 (15 February 1990). 
Available at: https://law.justia.com/cases/maine/supreme-
court/1990/569-a-2d-1202-0.html.  
[60] In the Matter of Nickolas Christopher for an Order 
Authorizing the Involuntary Medical Treatment of Anna 
Kushnir, 177 Misc.2d 352, 675 N.Y.S.2d 807 (21 May 
1998). Available at: 
https://www.leagle.com/decision/1998529177misc2d3521
467. 
[61] Hardwig, J. (2005). Families and Futility: Forestalling 
Demands for Futile Treatment. Journal of Clinical Ethics 
16 (4) 328-337. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
